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Abstract
We consider a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables.
There are n players, n≥ 3. Each player is denoted by i. Two strategic variables are ti and
si, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. They are related by invertible functions. Using the minimax theorem by
Sion (1958) we will show that Nash equilibria in the following states are equivalent.
1. All players choose ti, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, (as their strategic variables).
2. Some players choose ti’s and the other players choose si’s.
3. All players choose si, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
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1 Introduction
We consider a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. There
are n players, n ≥ 3. Each player is denoted by i. Two strategic variables are ti and si, i ∈
{1, . . . ,n}. They are related by invertible functions. Using the minimax theorem by Sion
(1958) we will show that Nash equilibria in the following states are equivalent.
1. All players choose ti, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, (as their strategic variables).
2. Some players choose ti’s and the other players choose si’s.
3. All players choose si, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
In the next section we present a model of this paper and prove some preliminary results
which are variations of Sion’s minimax theorem. In Section 3 we will show the main results.
An example of a multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables is a relative profit
maximization game in an oligopoly with differentiated goods. See Section 4.
2 The model and the minimax theorem
We consider a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. There
are n players, n ≥ 3. Two strategic variables are ti and si, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. ti is chosen from Ti
and si is chosen from Si. Ti and Si are convex and compact sets in linear topological spaces,
respectively, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. We denote N = {1, . . . ,n}. The relations of the strategic
variables are represented by
si = fi(t1, . . . , tn), i ∈ N,
and
ti = gi(s1, . . . ,sn), i ∈ N.
fi(t1, . . . , tn) and gi(s1, . . . ,sn) are continuous invertible functions, and so they are one-to-
one and onto functions. Let M = {1, . . . ,m}, 0 ≤ m ≤ n, be a subset of N, and denote
N −M = {m+ 1, . . . ,n}. When n−m players in N −M choose si’s, ti’s for them are de-
termined according to


tm+1 = gm+1( f1(t1, . . . , tm, tm+1, . . . , tn), . . . , fm(t1, . . . , tm, tm+1, . . . , tn),sm+1, . . . ,sn)
. . .
tn = gn( f1(t1, . . . , tm, tm+1, . . . , tn), . . . , fm(t1, . . . , tm, tm+1, . . . , tn),sm+1, . . . ,sn).
We denote these ti’s by ti(t1, . . . , tm,sm+1, . . . ,sn).
When all players choose si’s, i ∈ N, ti’s for them are determined according to


t1 = g1(s1, . . . ,sn)
. . .
tn = gn(s1, . . . ,sn).
Denote these ti’s by ti(s1, . . . ,sn).
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The payoff function of Player i is ui, i ∈ N. It is written as
ui(t1, . . . , tn).
We assume
ui : T1× ·· ·×Tn ⇒ R for each i ∈ N is continuous on T1× ·· ·×Tn. Thus, it is
continuous on S1×·· ·×Sn through fi, i ∈ N. It is quasi-concave on Ti and Si for
a strategy of each other player, and quasi-convex on Tj, j 6= i and S j, j 6= i for
each ti and si.
We do not assume differentiability of the payoff functions.
Symmetry of the game means that the payoff functions of all players are symmetric and in
the payoff function of each Player i, Players j and k, j,k 6= i, are interchangeable. fi’s and
gi’s are symmetric. Since the game is a zero-sum game, the sum of the values of the payoff
functions of the players is zero. All Ti’s are identical, and all Si’s are identical. Denote them
by T and S.
Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for a continuous
function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological
spaces, and let f : X ×Y → R be a function that is continuous and quasi-concave in the first
variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable. Then
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
f (x,y) =min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
f (x,y).
We follow the description of Sion’s theorem in Kindler (2005).
Applying this lemma to the situation of this paper such that m players choose ti’s and n−m
players choose si’s as their strategic variables, we have the following relations.
max
ti∈T
min
t j∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl) =min
t j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl).
max
ti∈T
min
s j∈S
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) =min
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl),
where tk is a vector of tk, k ∈M, of the players other than Players i and j who choose tk’s as
their strategic variables. On the other hand, tl is a vector of tl, l ∈ N−M, of the players other
than Player j who choose sl’s as their strategic variables. Also, relations which are symmetric
to them hold. ui(ti, t j, tk, tl) is the payoff of Player i when Players i and j choose ti and t j. On
the other hand, ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) means the payoff of Player i when he chooses ti and
Player j chooses s j.
Further we show the following results.
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Lemma 2.
max
t j∈T
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j, tk, tl) =max
s j∈S
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl)
=min
ti∈T
max
s j∈S
u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) =min
ti∈T
max
t j∈T
u j(ti, t j, tk, tl),
u j(ti, t j, tk, tl) is the payoff of Player j when Players i and j choose ti and t j. On the other
hand, u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) means the payoff of Player j when he chooses s j and Player i
chooses ti.
Proof. minti∈T u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) is the minimum of u j with respect to ti given s j. Let
t˜i(s j) = argminti∈T u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl), and fix the value of t j at
t0j = g j( fi(t˜i(s j), t
0
j , tk, tl),s j, fk,sl), (1)
where fk denotes a vector of the values of sk’s of players who choose tk’s, and sl denotes a
vector of the values of sl’s of players who choose sl’s. Then, we have
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t
0
j , tk, tl)≤ u j(t˜i(s j), t
0
j , tk, tl) =min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl),
where minti∈T u j(ti, t
0
j , tk, tl) is the minimum of u j with respect to ti given the value of t j at
t0j . We assume that t˜i(s j) = argminti∈T u j(u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl)) is single-valued. By the
maximum theorem and continuity of u j, t˜i(s j) is continuous. Then, any value of t
0
j can be
realized by appropriately choosing s j according to (1). Therefore,
max
t j∈T
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j, tk, tl)≤max
s j∈S
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl). (2)
On the other hand, minti∈T u j(ti, t j, tk, tl) is the minimum of u j with respect to ti given t j.
Let t˜i(t j) = argminti∈T u j(ti, t j, tk, tl), and fix the value of s j at
s0j = f j(t˜i(t j), t j, tk, tl). (3)
Then, we have
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j(ti,s
0
j , tk, tl), tk, tl)≤ u j(t˜i(t j), t j(t˜i(t j),s
0
j, tk, tl), tk, tl) =min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j, tk, tl),
where minti∈T u j(ti, t j(ti,s
0
j , tk, tl), tk, tl) is the minimum of u j with respect to ti given the value
of s j at s
0
j . We assume that t˜i(t j) = argminti∈T u j(ti, t j, tk, tl) is single-valued. By the maximum
theorem and continuity of u j, t˜i(t j) is continuous. Then, any value of s
0
j can be realized by
appropriately choosing t j according to (3). Therefore,
max
s j∈S
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl)tk, tl)≤max
t j∈T
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j, tk, tl). (4)
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Combining (2) and (4), we get
max
s j∈S
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl)tk, tl) =max
t j∈T
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j, tk, tl).
Since any value of s j can be realized by appropriately choosing t j, we have
max
s j∈S
u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) =max
t j∈T
u j(ti, t j, tk, tl).
Thus,
min
ti∈T
max
s j∈S
u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) =min
ti∈T
max
t j∈T
u j(ti, t j, tk, tl).
Therefore,
max
t j∈T
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j, tk, tl) =max
s j∈S
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl)
=min
ti∈T
max
s j∈S
u j(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) =min
ti∈T
max
t j∈T
u j(ti, t j, tk, tl).
Lemma 3.
min
t j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl) =min
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl)
=max
ti∈T
min
s j∈S
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) =max
ti∈T
min
t j∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl),
Proof. maxti∈T ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) is the maximum of ui with respect to ti given s j. Let
t¯i(s j) = argmaxti∈T ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl), and fix the value of t j at
t0j = g j( fi(t¯i(s j), t
0
j , tk, tl),s j, fk,sl), (5)
where fk denotes a vector of the values of sk’s of players who choose tk’s, and sl denotes a
vector of the values of sl’s of players who choose sl’s. Then, we have
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
0
j , tk, tl)≥ ui(t¯i(s j), t
0
j , tk, tl) =max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl),
where maxti∈T ui(ti, t
0
j , tk, tl) is the maximum of ui with respect to ti given the value of t j
at t0j . We assume that t¯i(s j) = argmaxti∈T ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) is single-valued. By the
maximum theorem and continuity of ui, t¯i(s j) is continuous. Then, any value of t
0
j can be
realized by appropriately choosing s j according to (5). Therefore,
min
t j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl)≥min
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl). (6)
On the other hand, maxti∈T ui(ti, t j, tk, tl) is the maximum of ui with respect to ti given t j.
Let t¯i(t j) = argmaxti∈T ui(ti, t j, tk, tl), and fix the value of s j at
s0j = f j(t¯i(t j), t j, tk, tl). (7)
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Then, we have
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s
0
j , tk, tl), tk, tl)≥ ui(t¯i(s j), t j(ti,s
0
j , tk, tl), tk, tl) =max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl),
where maxti∈T ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) is the maximum of ui with respect to ti given the value
of s j at s
0
j . We assume that t¯i(t j)= argmaxti∈T ui(ti, t j, tk, tl) is single-valued. By the maximum
theorem and continuity of ui, t¯i(t j) is continuous. Then, any value of s
0
j can be realized by
appropriately choosing t j according to (7). Therefore,
min
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl)≥min
t j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl). (8)
Combining (6) and (8), we get
min
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) =min
t j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl).
Since any value of s j can be realized by appropriately choosing t j, we have
min
s j∈S
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) =min
t j∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl).
Thus,
max
ti∈T
min
s j∈S
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) =max
ti∈T
min
t j∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl).
Therefore,
min
t j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl) =min
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl),
=max
ti∈T
min
s j∈S
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, tk, tl), tk, tl) =max
ti∈T
min
t j∈T
ui(ti, t j, tk, tl).
3 The main results
In this section we present the main results of this paper. First we show
Theorem 1. The equilibrium where all players choose ti’s is equivalent to the equilibrium
where one player (Player j) chooses s j and all other players choose ti’s as their strategic
variables.
Proof. 1. Consider a situation (t1, . . . , tn) = (t, . . . , t), that is, all players choose the same
value of ti. Let
s0(t) = fi(t, . . . , t), i ∈ N.
By symmetry of the game
max
t1∈T
u1(t1, t, . . . , t) = · · ·=max
tn∈T
un(t, . . . , tn),
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and
argmax
t1∈T
u1(t1, t, . . . , t) = · · ·= argmax
tn∈T
un(t, . . . , tn).
Consider the following function.
t → argmax
ti∈T
ui(ti, t, . . . , t), i ∈ N.
Since this function is continuous and T is compact, there exists a fixed point. Denote it
by t∗. Then,
t∗→ argmax
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗).
We have
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) = 0, for all i ∈ N.
2. Because the game is zero-sum,
ui(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗)+
n
∑
j=1, j 6=i
u j(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) = 0.
By symmetry
ui(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗)+(n−1)u j(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) = 0.
This means
ui(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) =−(n−1)u j(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗).
and
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) =−(n−1)min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗).
From this we get
argmax
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) = argmin
ti∈T
u j(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) = t∗.
We have
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) =min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) = ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗) = 0.
By symmetry
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) =min
t j∈T
ui(t j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) = 0.
Then,
min
t j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗)≤max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗)
=min
t j∈T
ui(t j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗)≤max
ti∈T
min
t j∈T
ui(ti, t j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗).
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From Lemma 3 we obtain
min
t j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) =max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) =min
t j∈T
ui(t j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) (9)
=max
ti∈T
min
t j∈T
ui(ti, t j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) =min
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗)
=max
ti∈T
min
s j∈S
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗) = 0.
3. Since any value of s j can be realized by appropriately choosing t j,
min
s j∈S
ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), . . . , t∗) =min
t j∈T
ui(t
∗
, t j, t
∗
. . . , t∗) (10)
= ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗) = 0.
Then,
argmin
s j∈S
ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗) = s0(t∗).
(9) and (10) mean
min
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗) (11)
=min
s j∈S
ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗) = 0.
And we have
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗)≥ ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗).
Then,
argmin
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗)
= argmin
s j∈S
ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗) = s0(t∗).
Note s0(t∗) = f (t∗, t∗, . . . , t∗).
Thus, by (11)
min
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗) =max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s
0(t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗)
=min
s j∈S
ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗) = ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s0(t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗) = 0.
Therefore,
argmax
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s
0(t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗) = t∗. (12)
This holds for all i ∈ N, i 6= j.
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On the other hand, because any value of s j is realized by appropriately choosing t j,
max
s j∈S
u j(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗)) =max
t j∈T
u j(t
∗
, t j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗) = u j(t
∗
, . . . , t∗) = 0.
Therefore,
argmax
s j∈S
u j(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
, . . . , t∗)) = s0(t∗). (13)
From (12) and (13), (t∗,s0(t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗) is a Nash equilibrium which is equivalent to
(t∗, . . . , t∗). (t∗,s0(t∗), t∗, . . . , t∗) denotes an equilibrium where ti = t
∗, s j = s
0(t∗) and
tk = t
∗ for k 6= i, j.
Consider a Nash equilibrium where m players choose t∗ and n−m players choose s0(t∗).
Let tk be a vector of tk, k ∈M, of players other than i and j who choose tk’s as their strategic
variables; tl be a vector of tl, l ∈N−M, of players who choose sl’s as their strategic variables.
These expressions mean that ti = t j = t
∗; each tk = t
∗ and each sl = s
0(t∗). We write such
an equilibrium as (ti, t j, tk, tl,) = (t
∗, t∗, t∗k, t
∗
l ,). In the next theorem, based on Assumption 1,
we will show that such a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium where m− 1
players choose t∗ and n−m+1 players choose s0(t∗).
Now we assume
Assumption 1. At the equilibrium where m players choose t∗ and n−m players choose s0(t∗),
the responses of uk and ul to a small change in ti have the same sign.
uk is the payoff of each player, other than i, whose strategic variable is tk, and ul is the
payoff of each player whose strategic variable is sl.
When ti= t
∗ and sl = s
0(t∗) for i∈M, l ∈N−M, we have tl = t
∗ for all l ∈N−M.
uk, k ∈M \ i and ul, l ∈ N−M respond to a change in ti, i ∈M given tk, k ∈M \ i
and sl, l ∈ N−M. Since sk, k ∈ M \ i and tl, l ∈ N −M are not constant, the
responses of uk, k ∈ M \ i and the responses of ul, l ∈ N −M to a change in
ti, i∈M may be different. However, because all ti’s are equal and all ui’s for i∈N
are equal at the equilibrium, we may assume that the responses of uk, i ∈ M \ i
and the responses of ul, l ∈ N−M to a change in ti, i ∈M have the same sign in
a sufficiently small neighborhood of the equilibrium.
Using this assumption we show the following result.
Theorem 2. The equilibrium where m, 2≤ m≤ n−1, players choose ti’s and n−m players
choose si’s as their strategic variables is equivalent to the equilibrium where m− 1 players
choose ti’s and n−m+1 players choose si’s as their strategic variables.
Proof. Suppose that Player i chooses ti in both equilibria, but Player j chooses t j when m
players choose ti’s and he chooses s j when m−1 players choose ti’s. Then,
argmax
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l ) = argmax
t j∈T
u j(t
∗
, t j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = t
∗
.
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Since any value of t j is realized by appropriately choosing s j, we get
max
s j∈S
u j(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) =max
t j∈T
u j(t
∗
, t j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = u j(t
∗
, t∗, t∗k, t
∗
l ),
and
argmax
s j∈S
u j(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = s
0(t∗). (14)
Since the game is zero-sum,
ui(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l )+u j(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l )+(m−2)uk(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l )+(n−m)ul(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l ) = 0,
and so
ui(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l ) =−[u j(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l )+(m−2)uk(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l )+(n−m)ul(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l )],
uk denotes the payoff of each player who chooses tk as its strategic variable. Player j is one
of such players. ul denotes the payoff of each player who chooses sl as its strategic variable.
Then, we obtain
ui(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l ) =−[(m−1)u j(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l )+(n−m)ul(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l )].
Thus,
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l ) =−min
ti∈T
[(m−1)u j(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l )+(n−m)ul(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l )].
By Assumption 1 since ui(ti, t
∗, t∗k, t
∗
l )≤ 0,
u j(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l )≥ 0, ul(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l )≥ 0,
in any neighborhood of (t∗, t∗, t∗k , t
∗
l ). Thus, we have
min
ti∈T
u j(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l ) = 0,
argmin
ti∈T
u j(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l ) = t
∗
, (15a)
min
ti∈T
ul(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l ) = 0,
and
argmin
ti∈T
ul(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l ) = t
∗
. (15b)
By symmetry
min
t j∈T
ui(t
∗
, t j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = 0,
argmin
t j∈T
ui(t
∗
, t j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = t
∗
.
Thus,
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, t∗k , t
∗
l ) =min
t j∈T
ui(t
∗
, t j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = ui(t
∗
, t∗, t∗k , t
∗
l ) = 0.
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Then,
min
t j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l )≤max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l ) =min
t j∈T
ui(t
∗
, t j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l )≤max
ti∈T
min
t j∈T
ui(ti, t j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ).
From Lemma 3
min
t j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) =max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
∗
, t∗k, t
∗
l ) =min
t j∈T
ui(t
∗
, t j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) (16)
=max
ti∈T
min
t j∈T
ui(ti, t j, t
∗
k , t
∗
l ) =min
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l )
=max
ti∈T
min
s j∈S
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, t
∗
k , t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ).
Since any value of t j is realized by appropriately choosing s j given si = s
0(t∗) for all i 6= n,
min
t j∈T
ui(t
∗
, t j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) =min
s j∈S
ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = 0. (17)
Thus,
argmin
s j∈S
ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
k , t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = s
0(t∗).
From (16) and (17)
min
s j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) =min
s j∈S
ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = 0. (18)
And we have
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, t
∗
k , t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l )≥ ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, t
∗
k , t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ).
Then,
argmin
s j∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, t
∗
k , t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = argmin
s j∈S
ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l )), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = s
0(t∗).
By (18) we get
min
s j∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s j, t
∗
k, t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) =max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s
0(t∗), t∗k, t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l )
=min
s j∈S
ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s j, t
∗
k , t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = ui(t
∗
, t j(t
∗
,s0(t∗), t∗k, t
∗
l )), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = 0.
Therefore,
argmax
ti∈T
ui(ti, t j(ti,s
0(t∗), t∗k, t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) = t
∗
. (19)
This holds for all i ∈ N, i 6= j.
From (14) and (19) (t∗, t j(t
∗,s0(t∗), t∗k, t
∗
l ), t
∗
k, t
∗
l ) is a Nash equilibrium which is equivalent
to (t∗, t∗, t∗k, t
∗
l ), and hence it is equivalent to (t
∗, . . . , t∗). Note that i and j are arbitrary.
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By mathematical induction this theorem means that the Nash equilibrium where one player
chooses ti and n− 1 players choose si’s as their strategic variables is equivalent to the Nash
equilibrium where all players choose ti’s as their strategic variables. Suppose that in the for-
mer equilibrium only Player n chooses tn and the other players choose si’s as their strategic
variables. Then, this equilibrium is denoted by (s0(t∗), . . . ,s0(t∗), t∗), and so
argmax
si∈S
ui(ti(si, tn,s
0(t∗), . . . ,s0(t∗)), tn,s
0(t∗), . . . ,s0(t∗)) = s0(t∗), for i 6= n,
argmax
tn∈T
un(ti(si, tn,s
0(t∗), . . . ,s0(t∗)), tn,s
0(t∗), . . . ,s0(t∗)) = t∗.
Since any value of tn is realized by appropriately choosing sn,
max
tn∈T
un(ti(si, tn,s
0(t∗), . . . ,s0(t∗)), tn,s
0(t∗), . . . ,s0(t∗))
=max
sn∈T
un(ti(si,sn,s
0(t∗), . . . ,s0(t∗)), tn(si,sn,s
0(t∗), . . . ,s0(t∗)),s0(t∗), . . . ,s0(t∗)),
and
argmax
sn∈T
un(ti(si,sn, t
∗
l ), tn(si,sn, t
∗
l ), t
∗
l ) = s
0(t∗).
Then, (ti(si,sn, t
∗
l ), tn(si,sn, t
∗
l ), t
∗
l ) is a Nash equilibrium, in which all players choose s
0(t∗). It
is equivalent to (t∗, . . . , t∗).
Summarizing the results we have shown
Theorem 3. Nash equilibria in the following states are equivalent.
1. All players choose ti, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} (as their strategic variables).
2. Some players choose ti’s and the other players choose si’s.
3. All players choose si, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
4 Example of an asymmetric multi-players zero-sum
game
Consider a relative profit maximization game in an oligopolywith three firms producing differ-
entiated goods1. It is an example of multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables.
The firms are A, B and C. The strategic variables are the outputs and the prices of the goods
of the firms.
We consider the following four cases.
1About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition please see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato
(2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka (2013a),
Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997)
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1. Case 1: All firms determine their outputs.
The inverse demand functions are
pA = a− xA−bxB−bxC,
pB = a− xB−bxA−bxC,
and
pC = a− xC−bxA−bxB,
where 0< b< 1. pA, pB and pC are the prices of the goods of Firm A, B and C, and xA,
xB and xC are the outputs of them.
2. Case 2: Firms A and B determine their outputs, and Firm C determines the price of its
good.
From the inverse demand functions,
pA = (1−b)a+b
2xB−bxB+b
2xA− xA+bpC,
pB = (1−b)a+b
2xB− xB+b
2xA−bxA+bpC,
and
xC = a−bxB−bxA− pC
are derived.
3. Case 3: Firms B and C determine the prices of their goods, and Firm A determines its
output.
Also, from the above inverse demand functions, we obtain
pA =
(1−b)a+2b2xA−bxA− xA+bpC+bpB
1+b
,
xB =
(1−b)a+b2xA−bxA+bpC− pB
(1−b)(1+b)
,
and
xC =
(1−b)a+b2xA−bxA− pC+bpB
(1−b)(1+b
.
4. Case 4: All firms determine the prices of their goods.
From the inverse demand functions the direct demand functions are derived as follows;
xA =
(1−b)a− (1+b)pA+b(pA+ pC)
(1−b)(1+2b)
,
xB =
(1−b)a− (1+b)pB+b(pB+ pC)
(1−b)(1+2b)
,
and
xC =
(1−b)a− (1+b)pC+b(pA+ pB)
(1−b)(1+2b)
.
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The (absolute) profits of the firms are
piA = pAxA− cAxA,
piB = pBxB− cBxB,
and
piC = pCxC− cCxC.
cA, cB and cC are the constant marginal costs of Firm A, B and C. The relative profits of the
firms are
ϕA = piA−
piB+piC
2
,
ϕB = piB−
piA+piC
2
,
and
ϕC = piC−
piA+piB
2
.
The firms determine the values of their strategic variables to maximize the relative profits. We
see
ϕA+ϕB+ϕC = 0,
so the game is zero-sum.
We compare the equilibrium prices of the good of Firm B in four cases. Denote the value
of pB in each case by p
1
B, p
2
B, p
3
B and p
4
B. Then, we get
p1B =
3bcC−2b
2cB+bcB+4cB+3bcA+ab
2−5ab+4a
(4−b)(b+2)
,
p2B =
A
(4−b)(b+2)(3b+4)
,
p3B =
B
(b+2)(b+4)(5b+4)
,
and
p4B =
3b2cC+3bcC+4b
2cB+7bcB+4cB+3b
2cA+3bcA−5ab
2+ab+4a
(b+2)(5b+4)
,
where
A= 9b2cC+12bcC−3b
3cB+b
2cB+16bcB+16cB−3b
3cA+3b
2cA+12bcA+3ab
3−11ab2−8ab+16a,
and
B=6b3cC+21b
2cC+12bcC+b
3cB+17b
2cB+32bcB+16cB+3b
3cA+15b
2cA
+12bcA−5ab
3−19ab2+8ab+16a.
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When cC = cA, they are
p1B =
bcB−2b
2cB+4cB+6bcA+ab
2−5ab+4a
(4−b)(b+2)
,
p2B =
b2cB−3b
3cB+16bcB+16cB−3b
3cA+12b
2cA+24bcA+3ab
3−11ab2−8ab+16a
(4−b)(b+2)(3b+4)
,
p3B =
b3cB+17b
2cB+32bcB+16cB+9b
3cA+36b
2cA+24bcA−5ab
3−19ab2+8ab+16a
(b+2)(b+4)(5b+4)
,
and
p4B =
4b2cB+7bcB+4cB+6b
2cA+6bcA−5ab
2+ab+4a
(b+2)(5b+4)
.
Further when cC = cB = cA, we get
p1B = p
2
B = p
3
B = p
4
B =
2bcA+ cA−ab+a
b+2
.
We can show the same result for the equilibrium prices of the goods of the other firms. Thus,
in a fully symmetric game the four cases are equivalent.
It can be verified that this example with cA = cB = cC satisfies Assumption 1 in the sense
that
the argmin (argument of the minimum) of the relative profit of Firm Bwith respect
to the strategy of Firm A is equal to that of Firm C with the Nash equilibrium
strategies of Firms B and C in Case 2 and Case 3. See (15a) and (15b).
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that in a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strate-
gic variables, choice of strategic variables is irrelevant to the Nash equilibrium. In an asym-
metric situation the Nash equilibrium depends on the choice of strategic variables by players
other than two-players case2.
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